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I

WHETHER ULTIMATE REALITY is to
be conceived as a personal God or an
impersonal principle somehow at work in
the world is an issue which tends to divide
the major world religions into opposing
camps. Furthermore, even within a given
religion philosophers and theologians may
differ on how God or Ultimate Reality is to
be conceived. Within Vedantic Hinduism,
for example, SaIikara and Ramanuja are
clearly in opposition on this point even
though they share the same basic world view
in so many other respects. Likewise,
Christian philosophers and theologians have
through the centuries disagreed over this
issue (e.g., the deeper reality of God in the
thought of Thomas Aquinas and Meister
Eckhart). At least one of the underlying
philosophical issues, moreover, seems to be
the question of infinity. If Ultimate Reality
is truly transcendent or infinite, i.e., beyond
human comprehension, then it cannot
simultaneously be personal. For, to be a
person would seem to involve being a
relational and thus finite reality, one whose
identity is fixed by relation to other persons.
Ultimate Reality may indeed take on the
appearance of personhood' for the religious
devotee. But in itself it must be beyond the
personal in order to remain infinite, in the
words of the Chandogya Upanishad, "one
without a second".l
In this article I will first review the rival
positions of Sailkara and Ramanuja on this
point and then pass to a consideration of the
thought of two contemporary Christian
theologians, Robert Neville and myself, in '
recently published books. I will indicate how
Neville's position bears some limited
resemblance to that of Sailkara just as mine

more closely resembles that of Ramanuja. In
any event, my deeper purpose here will be
first to illuminate the problem of attributing
infinity to God or whatever else is
considered to be Ultimate Reality and then,
in setting forth my own position, to indicate
how one might be able· to resolve that
problem by reconceiving infinity as a nondual reality in a special sense, namely, as an
immanent activity within entities rather than
as some kind of entity in its own right. For,
thus understood, it can be represented as
something that is necessarily both itself and
not itself at the same time.
To begin, then, if one accepts the idea
that Brahman is infinite, thatis, numerically
"one without a second", then SaIikara
appears to be right in maintaining that there
must be two distinct standpoints with respect
to knowledge of Brahman, namely, the
absolute and the relative. "The supreme
truth . is that Brahman is non-dual and
relationless. It alone is; there is nothing real
beside it. But from our standpoint, which is
the empirical, relative standpoint, Brahman
appears as God, the cause of the world.,,2
Logically, nothing else can be the case if
Brahman is infinite in' this sense. All
multiplicity must be an illusion. For, if
anything else besides Brahman really exists,
by that very fact it renders Brahman finite,
less than infinite. It is no longer "one
without a second". The fact that this other
entity is absolutely dependent upon Brahman
for its existence and activity, as in Madhva's
understanding of the God-world
relationship, 3 does p.ot alter the fact that it
nevertheless exists apart from Brahman and
thereby limits the alleged infinity of
Brahman. It is something that Brahman is not.
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Ramanuja's qualified non-dualism, to be
sure, offers a response precisely to this line
" of argument. Ramanuja, it will be
remembered, argues that creatures really
exist but only as part of Brahman, as the
"body" of Brahman. 4 Hence, their only
reality is to be various finite manifestations
of Brahman; in this sense, Brahman can still
be regarded as "one without a second".
Cogent as Ramanuja's argument may be at
first reading, it still seems to me that there
are logical problems associated with this
soul-body analogy for the God-world
relationship. For, on the one hand, if
Brahman is the Inner Self or antarylimi of
every created entity such that the entity is
totally under the control of Brahman, then it
would appear that that entity has no
ontological independence of Brahman, no
reality apart from Brahman. Ramanuja, for
example, has the following definition of a
body in his commentary on the BrahmliSutras: "Any entity that a sentient being is
able completely to control and support for
its own purpose, and the essential nature of
which is entirely subservient to that self, is
its body". 5 But, given such a definition, the
independent reality of the created entity is
quite ambiguous. It appears to be simply a
"mode" (priikiira) of the divine being; its
only meaning or value is to be a finite~
manifestation of the transcendent reality of

Brahman. 6
On the, other hand, if one argues that the
created entity, e. g., an individual self, is
sufficiently independent of Brahman to make
its own decision in line with its specific
karma or fate, albeit with the "permission"
of Brahman, 7 then the reality or ontological
independence of the created entity is assured
but Brahman is no longer "one without a
second". It is rather one among many. Even
though it is clearly the Highest Self, it is not
the Absolute Self. For it shares existence
with finite selves who likewise, at least to
some extent, control their own existence and
activity. Admittedly, these other entities are
dependent upon Brahman for that same·
existence and activity in that they constitute
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Brahman's "body." But, just as the human
body and soul together make up the
composite reality of an organism, so
Brahman would seem to be only a part,
though admittedly the controlling part, of
the composite reality which is Brahman plus
the world of Nature and of individual selves.

It would seem, then, that, given the
conventional understanding of Brahman as
infinite, Sailkara presents the inore logical
case. All appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, there can be only one reality.
Everything is Brahman; and Brahman itself
is transpersonal, beyond the personal. For
personhood is a relational concept. That is,
as Martin Buber pointed out in his
celebrated work I and Thou, I become a
person in saying Thou to you as another
person. Without a Thou, there is no personal
I. 8 But this once again would imply that
Brahman is not infinite, "one without a
second". Relation to another "I" would
render Brahman finite.
One may counterargue, to be sure, that
infinity when applied to the Hindu notion of
Brahman or Western notions of God should
be understood qualitatively not quantitatively. That is, Brahman or God implies the
qualitative fullness of being rather than a
single all-comprehensive entity. Yet, even if
Brahman, for example, is conventionally
described as saccidlinanda (being,
consciousness, bliss), i.e. more as a state of
being than an entity, such a perfect state of
being must somehow really exist; it must bee
the de facto experience of Atman or the
Supreme Self. Otherwise, the claim that
saccidlinanda really exists could readily be
dismissed as illusory, pure wish-fulfilment
on the part of unhappy human beings.
Similarly within the Christian tradition,
while God is no doubt qualitatively superior
to creatures, it does not follow that God is
for that same reason infinite in the sense
discussed above. ,For, as long as creatures
exist who subjectively exercise some of the
perfections objectively possessed by God,
then God must be said to share existence
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with these creatures and thus is not "one
without a second". By their very existence,
creatures limit the infinity of God even
though they exist only as reflections of the
divine being and perfection.
Thus the distinction between qualitative
and quantitative understandings of the
infinite cannot be sustained under careful
scrutiny. Logically, the qualitative
understanding of the infinite has to be
grounded in a quantitative understanding of
the infinite as numerically "one without a
second" . What is presupposed here, of
course, is that the Infinite is somehow an
entity: for Sailkara, the Absolute Self; for
Ramanuja, the Highest Self; for Christian
theologians, God as the Supreme Being. On
the other hand, if the infinity of God or
Brahman were rethought in strictly nonentitative terms, namely, as the reality of an
all-comprehensive activity, then the
relationship between Brahman (or God) and
finite entities might well be established on a
new basis.
What do I mean, however, by the term
"an all-comprehensive activity"? My
supposition is that entities exist both in
themselves and in dynamic relation to one
another only by virtue of an underlying
activity which serves as the ontologi~al
ground for their existence and activity. 9
Every entity, accordingly, is dualdimensional. . There is its underlying
ontological ground and its existence as an
entity in virtue of that same ground. lO As
I see it, this could well be the basis for a
new understanding of the much controverted
notion of non-duality in the Vedanta
tradition. That is, non-duality does not exist
in the first place between an infinite entity
and finite entities, but rather between the
grounding activity at work within an entity
and the entity itself as an existing reality.
For they are not simply identical; the
grounding activity is not an entity, and the
entity is other than the grounding activity.
At the same time they are not-two since only
together, namely, as grounding activity and
that which exists in virtue of the grounding
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activity, are they one concrete reality.
This grounding activity, moreover, is
infinite because it serves as the ontological
ground for literally everything that exists. It
is, accordingly, not limited by its activity in
any single entity. Rather, it transcends them
all since it is their common ground or
source of existence and activity. Whereas
entities are inevitably limited or defined by
their relations to one another, this grounding
activity is strictly unlimited and· therefore
infinite since it has no rival. In the words of
the Chandogya Upanishad, it is "one without
a second". aut it is "one without a second"
as an activity rather than as an entity. An
infinite entity by definition eliminates the
possibility of other entities besides itself
which really exist. An infinite activity, on
the contrary, only makes sense in terms of
many entities in dynamic interrelation. The
only reason for an infinite activity to exist
is, in other words, to empower entities to
exist both in themselves and in relation to
one another as members of a common
wodd. 11
What I am arguing here, accordingly, is
that a distinction should be made between
Brahman and Atman within the Vedantic
tradition and between the act of being and
God in the Christian tradition. Brahman and
its counterpart· in the Christian tradition, the
act of being, are to be considered infinite
because they are two names for one and the
same ontological reality, namely, an
underlying activity which brings into
existence and relates to one another all the
entities (both divine and creaturely) that
exist. Atman, on the other hand, and the
personal God of Christian belief represent
the Supreme Being, that which possesses this
activity by nature and which somehow
shares it with all other beings. Thus, as I
argue in The Divine Matrix, one can and
should distinguish in the Vedantic tradition
between the cosmic Self or supreme Atman,
the atman of the individual finite self and
Brahman as the underlying ontological
activity common to them both which links
them in an I-Thou relationship. 12
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Similarly, in the Christian tradition, one
should distinguish between God, the
individual creature, and the act of being
common to them both which links them as
Creator and creature within a common
world.
In The Divine Matrix, I devoted a
chapter to an analysis of the "Great
Sayings" in the Upanishads and to a
somewhat more detailed analysis of the
writings of SaiIkara and Ramanuja, all in the
light of this new understanding of the
Infinite as an underlying activitr; rather than
as a transcendent entity. 3 In the
remaining pages of this article, accordingly,
I will focus on the writings of two
contemporary Christian theologians, namely,
Robert Neville of Boston University and
myself, in which this notion of the Infinite
as an underlying activity rather than as a
transcendent entity comes to the fore in the
analysis of the God-world relationship from
a Christian perspective. I will offer a brief
summary of our two positions and then
indicate how in a curious way we reflect the
different stances taken by Sailkara and.
Ramanuja on the reality of Brahman/Atman.
In Behind the Masks of God, Neville
argues that every entity is a "harmony" of
essential and conditional features, i.e., of
featur,es which distinguish it from other
entities and of features which link it to other
entities. 14 He then adds: Given the
existence of two such entities, each with its
own harmony of essential and conditional
features,

, i
!

I,:'

I'

l

i;

there must be an ontologial ground of
mutual togetherness in which each with
both essential and conditional features
faces the other with both essential and
conditional features. I propose that this
ground is ontological creativity,
creativity of the very being of all things
insofar as they are together in any sense
whatever. 15

Finally, he also notes that ontological
creativity "is the presence of the wholly
transcendent God beyond God creating the
determinate creatures of the earth but
I

i

without determinate character of divinity
apart from creating." 16
This somewhat cryptic reference to God
Neville spells out in a later book in the
following manner. The doctrine of creation
out of nothing (ex nihilo) has three
components; the creative source, the creative
act, and the created product. The created
product is not only the world of finite
entities but the determinate reality of God as
their creator. God, in other words, moves
from pure indeterminacy to determinate
reality in creating the world. The creative
act is the ontological creativity referred to
above. Finally, the creative source is God as
wholly indeterminate apart from creation.
Neville's reasoning here is that, if God were
a determinate reality apart from creation,
then one would have to postulate still
another reality beyond God which would
provide the ontological reason for God's
determinateness apart from creation.
Ultimate reality, in other words, must be
intrinsically indeterminate; for otherwise one
is always faced with the question how it
became determinate. 17
Neville's conception of the God-world
relationship is, accordingly, in some ways
close to that of SaIikara. Neville argues that
God· as creative source is purely
indeterminate; in that respect, God as
creative source is akin to SaIikara's notion of
Brahman. Likewise, Neville argues that God
is creator or a determinate reality only
through interaction with creatures, somewhat
the way that SaiIkara arg.ues that Brahman is
manifest as ISvara (Lord) only in interaction
with human beings in search of an
explanation for the origin of reality. On the
other hand, unlike Sailkara, Neville
postulates the real existence of finite entities
apart from Brahman as the indeterminate
source of reality and, above all, the real
existence of a universal grounding activity
which he calls ontological creativity (as
opposed to SaiIkara's more ambivalent
position on the status and function of miiyii).
My own position is certainly more in
line with orthodox Christian theology and

I
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possibly more in line with the personalistic
theism of Ramanuja. For I argue that the
ontological creativity or grounding activity
at work within and among the entities of this
world does not emanate from a totally
unknown source as Neville claims but from
God in terms of the divine nature, that
which makes God to be God, even apart
from creation. Even God as a personal being
or entitative reality, in other words, requires
a grounding activity in order to exist; but
this grounding activity, as I see it, is the
divine nature. It is, so to speak, the hidden
dimension of God just as the grounding
activity is the hidden dimension of the being
or entitative reality of every created entity.
Thus, while Neville is correct in saying that
only something indeterminate can explain
what is determinate, that indeterminate
reality is not completely unknown. It can be
identified as the divine nature, that which,
first of all, makes God to be God and then
secondly, through the act of creation, that
which makes all creatures both to be
themselves and to exist in relation to one
another and to God. 18
The possible affinity of my scheme with
the thought of Ramanuja consists in the fact
that we both seem to be aiming at a
panentheistic' understanding of the
God-w~rld relationship. That is, we both
believe that finite entities exist in God and
through the power of God. This is what
Ramanuja e~idently had in mind with the
metaphor of the world as the "body" of
God. Likewise, this is what I have in mind
with the argument that creatures exist in and
through participation in the divine nature or
divine act of being. Where we differ, of
course, is that for Ramanuja finite entities,
at least from one perspective, have no
reality except as "modes" or finite
manifestations of Brahman or Vi~,!u; for me,
on the other' hand, finite entities
unambiguously have their own real existence
and activity apart from God as a
transcendent entity even as they depend on
the divine nature for that same existence and
activity. In my scheme, accordingly, finite
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entities are less the "body" of God than coexistent members of a cosmic society with
God. The unity of the cosmic society,
moreover, is not the unity of God as its
transcendent member but the dynamic unity
brought about by the divine nature as the
underlying principle of existence and activity
for all the members, God included. It is the
unity of a specifically social reality rather
than the unity of an individual entity as in
Ramanuja's scheme.
To sum up, then, the relationship
between the Infinite and the finite would
seem to be necessarily non-dual; somehow
the Infinite must encompass the finite or it is
not really infinite. This would seem to be
the enduring insight which a Westerner like
myself should gain from pondering the
"Great Sayings" out of the Upanishads and
the writings of SaIikara and Ramanuja. What
this paper, on the other hand, has argued is
that there are two distinct options for what
one means here by the' Infinite. If the
Infinite is understood in quasi-entitative
terms, then the position of SaIikara would
seem to be logically more consistent than
that of either Ramanuja or various Christian
theologians like Neville or myself. Because,
if an infinite entity is truly "one without a
second", then multiplicity is an illusion. All
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding,
only Brahman really exists.
But, if the Infinite is understood to be an
all-comprehensive activity such as Neville
and I have urged, then finite entities really
. exist and, at least within my scheme, a
personal God in dynamic interaction with
these finite entities really exists. The
governing idea here is that there is a nondual relationship between a universal
grounding activity called creativity and the
entities which it thereby empowers to exist.
Both the grounding activity and the entities
really exist unlike the non-dual relationship,
first, within Sailkara's scheme between the
Absolute Self and ,finite entities in which
finite entities ultimately do not exist and
then within Ramanuja's scheme in which the
relation of finite entities to Brahman or

,
,
! '
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Visnu remains somewhat ambiguous. One
can, in other words, equivalently "have
one's cake and eat it too". Both the Infinite
and the finite can be seen as real without
logical contradiction. Neither is ultimately
illusory. 19
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